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Abstract
Searle’s Chinese Room argument is refuted by showing that he has
actually given two different versions of the room, which fail for different
reasons.
1 Introduction
In [3], Searle tried “to show that a system could have input and output
capabilities that duplicated those of a native Chinese speaker and still
not understand Chinese”. To do so, he conducted a Gedankenexperiment
known as the Chinese Room which has been widely discussed thereafter
[2, Introduction] [1, Introduction].1 But even after 24 years, there seems
to be no general agreement on Searle’s argument that computers are in-
capable of understanding. In the hope of putting this argument to rest,
I will show that the argument actually consists of two different versions,
each of which fails for a different reason. In contrast to earlier critiques,
I reconstruct only where absolutely necessary, sticking as close to Searle’s
text as possible, concentrating solely on refuting the argument. I specifi-
cally do not take any position on whether computers can understand, have
cognitive states, think, are human, have intentionality, etc. I’m assuming
familiarity with Searle’s paper, and have provided links to online sources
for all references in the bibliography.
2 The Chinese Room Argument
This is the original version:
I do not understand a word of the Chinese stories. I have
inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the
native Chinese speaker, [. . . ] but I still understand nothing.
For the same reasons, Schank’s computer understands nothing
of any stories, [. . . ] since in the Chinese case the computer is
me, and in cases where the computer is not me, the computer
1A Google search for +Searle +“Chinese room” yields 7000+ hits on the WWW, and
4000+ on Usenet.
1
has nothing more than I have in the case where I understand
nothing.
The problem is with the sentence I emphasized. Not Searle, the room
creates outputs indistinguishable from those of native speakers. To see
this, just remove the program from the room. Searle himself stays unaf-
fected, but Chinese queries will no longer be correctly answered by the
room. To clarify: It is not computers that return output for input, it is
computers running a program. So a computer running the Chinese pro-
gram does have something that Searle doesn’t, and that is the Chinese
program. Since the analogy between Searle and a computer fails because
Searle is not running the same program as the computer, the conclusion
that “Schank’s computer understands nothing of any stories” is no longer
supported.
Searle commits the mistake of confusing himself and the room already
when he describes the room:
— that is, from the point of view of somebody outside the
room in which I am locked — my answers to the questions
are absolutely indistinguishable from those of native Chinese
speakers. Nobody just looking at my answers can tell that I
don’t speak a word of Chinese.
3 The Internalized Chinese Room Argu-
ment
This version of the room is used in the rejoinder to the systems reply:
Let the individual internalize all of these elements of the
system. He memorizes the rules in the ledger and the data
banks of Chinese symbols, and he does all the calculations in
his head. The individual then incorporates the entire system.
[. . . ] All the same, he understands nothing of the Chinese, and
a fortiori neither does the system, because there isn’t anything
in the system that isn’t in him. If he doesn’t understand,
then there is no way the system could understand because the
system is just a part of him.
In this case, it is indeed Searle who produces Chinese output. But now
he can no longer claim to not understand Chinese! To see this, note that
the Searle of the previous section did not speak any Chinese at all, and
therefore could not understand Chinese stories, using the (uncontrover-
sial) assumption that speaking a language is necessary for understanding
stories in that language. But if Searle internalizes the Chinese program,
we can no longer deny that he speaks Chinese, therefore we need an in-
dependent reason to deny that he understands Chinese. Searle does not
give any such reason, again failing to support his conclusion.
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4 Summary
Searle created two versions of the Chinese Room argument. The first
version fails because Searle, as opposed to the room containing him and
the Chinese program, is not equivalent to a computer running the Chinese
program, therefore his failure to understand Chinese does not force the
same failure upon the computer. The second version fails because Searle
failed to establish a reason for denying understanding of a language of
systems capable of speaking that language.
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